

A Security-Economics Trade-off? Public Support for the Quad in South Korea

Songying Fang
Department of Political Science
Rice University
The United States
sfang@rice.edu

Soyoung Lee
Department of Political Science
Stanford University
The United States
soylee37@stanford.edu

Xiaojun Li
Department of Political Science
University of British Columbia
Canada
xiaojun.li@ubc.ca

Abstract

South Korea has a security alliance with the United States while China is its largest trading partner. This triangular relationship presents South Korea with difficult foreign policy choices under the shadow of U.S.-China competition. One of such decisions is whether to join the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), a U.S.-led grouping widely viewed as aiming to counter China in the Indo-Pacific. South Korea's decision will not only be influenced by its relationships with both superpowers, but also by its domestic politics. Using a public opinion survey experiment, we investigate South Korean citizens' preferences toward the Quad. We find that there is close to majority support for joining the Quad, but neither the mentioning of security benefits of joining the Quad nor the mentioning of potential economic costs of joining the Quad changed the level of support. Instead, we find that threat perceptions and party affiliation are strongly correlated with respondents' preferences.

Keywords: Quad, South Korea, U.S.-China competition, Public Opinion, Survey Experiment

1. Introduction

From the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) to participating in the US-led Chip 4 alliance, South Korea has often been pressured to pick a side in an increasingly fierce competition between the United States and China (Hosokawa and Hoyama 2022; Kim 2020; Son 2022). Whether or not to join the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, a U.S.-led new grouping for strategic security dialogue between the United States, Australia, Japan, and India—colloquially known as the Quad—is likely one of such issues that South Korea must face in the coming years. This study seeks to understand how the choice of joining the Quad is perceived by the South Korean public.

In a key aspect, South Korea's dilemma under the shadow of great power competition is no different from numerous other countries in Asia. Leaders and analysts in the region have articulated a key trade-off involved in such decisions: the United States provides security protection for a country that either has territorial disputes with China or other security concerns, while China offers economic opportunities for the country. Closely aligning with the United States for security benefits would mean forgoing significant economic opportunities, and vice versa. Many leaders in the region have recognized the trade-off and have largely refused to choose a side (CSIS 2022; Straits Times 2022; Sochan 2022). Instead, they have sought to maintain security ties with the United States while improving trade relations with China. Such a strategy, often called hedging, has so far been successful in Southeast Asia, in part because it is consistent with domestic public preferences (Fang and Li 2022; Kuik 2016, 2022; Murphy 2017).

However, there is much more to be learned about foreign policy choices of middle powers in Asia given their differing geographic locations, security environments, and historical relations with China and the U.S. In the case of South Korea, its military alliance with the United States has been central to the country's defence strategies for decades. Joining the Quad may further cement the relationship and alleviate the fear of abandonment that has often bubbled up in South Korean domestic discourse (Work 2022a). On the other hand, China has been South Korea's largest trading partner for the last 20 years, replacing the United States in 2003 (World Bank). South Korea's outsized dependence on China for its exports as well as key imports has caused alarm in recent years (Na 2022; Yoon 2022), and the THAAD episode serves as a fresh reminder of the possible consequence of the dependency (Park 2022).

In addition, South Korea is confronted with a unique challenge in maintaining a balancing act between the United States and China. While South Korea relies heavily on the United States to counter North Korean nuclear threats, Beijing holds considerable leverage over Pyongyang, being its closest ally, and given the fact that North Korea is heavily dependent on China for trade while being under international sanctions for its nuclear programs (USIP 2019). It is thus important for South Korea to maintain cooperative relations with China for its goal of denuclearization of North Korea (Lee 2020). Given the complication, it is not obvious how the South Korean public view the security-economic trade-off in the country's alignment decision under the shadow of U.S.- China rivalry.

Why investigate public opinion when it is the leader that makes the decision of joining the Quad or not? The rise of nationalism since the end of the Cold war in Asia, combined with the advancement of communication technologies have brought mass attention to policy debates and forced the governments to heed the reactions of their publics in conducting foreign affairs (Fang and Li 2022; Fang et al. 2022; Heydarian 2017; Lee 2007; Montiel et al. 2014; Montiel and Dela Paz 2020; Vu 2013; Tonnesson 2016). South Korea is a particularly interesting case to study in this context given the country's complex historical relationships with both China and the U.S., and exceptionally widespread and vibrant online activities of its citizens. Understanding South Korean public opinion toward the question of whether to join the Quad thus can shed important insights on how the great power competition may shape up in Asia-Pacific in the coming decade.

With this goal in mind, we designed and implemented an online public opinion survey administered to a nationally representative sample of 2,153 respondents in South Korea in April 2022. The survey was embedded with a pre-registered experiment to tease out respondents' perceptions of the trade-off between security benefits and the economic costs of joining a US-led grouping. In addition, the survey includes questions that allow us to investigate how the South Korean public's preferences toward joining the Quad are correlated with their individual characteristics, their threat perceptions, and their economic self-interests. Finally, we incorporated open-ended questions in the survey to explore the rationales behind public support for and against joining the Quad.

We have three main findings. First, close to majority of the respondents in our sample support joining the Quad, but priming them with either the security benefits or potential economic costs of joining the Quad did not change the level of support in either direction. Second, threat perceptions strongly correlated with the attitudes toward the Quad: those who felt more threatened by China and North Korea were more likely to support joining the Quad, while those who felt more threatened by Japan were less likely to support it. Third, party affiliation matters. Supporter of the People's Power Party were more likely to endorse joining the Quad while supporters of the Minjoo Party were less likely to do so. Surprisingly, economic self-interest did not play a role in determining support for the Quad.

Our research contributes to a growing literature on the foreign policy decisions of middle powers in Asia under the shadow of U.S.-China competition. China's rise has offered economic opportunities for countries in Asia; at the same time, it has also caused some countries in the region to be concerned with the implications of China's growing economic and military dominance on their national interests. Theoretically, the study sheds insight on whether and how the trade-off between security relations with the U.S. and economic relations with China may drive foreign policy alignment preferences in these countries. Empirically, the study focuses on a gap in this literature—public preferences toward a key foreign policy issue that may have significant consequences for peace and security in the Indo-Pacific.

2. The Quad and South Korea's Choices

In the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) of the United States, prepared by the Defense Department for the Trump administration, the reemergence of great power competition was identified as the most important security trend facing the United States (DOD 2018). It was a

significant shift in national security priorities as regional threats had been the focus in previous iterations of the NDS. In addition, while both China and Russia were seen as primary adversaries of the United States, China and the Indo-pacific region were given the priority (DOD 2018; Panda 2018). Continuing the shift, in the more recent 2022 NDS, formulated under the Biden administration, China is again designated as the “most consequential competitor” (DOD 2022), and this is despite the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine having created crises at a global scale. The two documents suggest that there is broad consensus across U.S. administrations and the two main political parties regarding U.S. foreign policy priority: managing and countering the growing Chinese power.

In addition, both documents identify working with allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific as a key strategy to address the challenge. Against this backdrop, the Quad has become the most visible security architecture embodying the new U.S. defense strategy in the region. In the joint statement of the first-ever Quad summit held in March 2021, the leaders of the group expressed “a shared vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific,” and “meet challenges to rules-based maritime order in the East and South China seas.” While China was not mentioned in the statement, the forum is widely regarded as aiming to counter China’s influence and territorial ambitions in the Indo-Pacific region (Kemp 2021). China took the grouping as such and called it “Asian NATO” (Lin 2022; Mohan 2022). There is little question that the evolution of the Quad will be a significant indicator of how U.S. allies are responding to the evolving geopolitical tension in the region (Morford 2022).

Unlike NATO, which has existed as a formal military alliance for over 70 years, the nature of the Quad and how it may function as a security partnership are still in the early stage of development. The Quad was first proposed by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2007 to revive and institutionalize cooperation among four countries who jointly responded to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami (Lin 2022; Madan 2017). However, it was not until 2017 that the revival of the grouping truly took place when President Trump showed an interest in the framework as part of his China policy (Madan 2017). Its momentum picked up significantly under the Biden administration with four Quad leaders’ summits held since 2021, despite the challenge presented by the COVID-19 pandemic (The White House 2022).

Even at this early stage, where the members have largely met to hash out the agendas for the group, the idea of Quad Plus, i.e., expanding the membership to other nations, has already been seriously considered. The first Quad Plus meeting was held in March 2020, where senior representatives from New Zealand, South Korea, and Vietnam were invited to join; a second meeting of the Plus format was held in May of the same year, with South Korea, Israel and Brazil being the additional participants (Panda 2022). Among the potential “plus” members, South Korea has drawn the most attention (Govella, Mohan, and Bonnie Glaser 2022; Lee, Harris, and Yu 2022; Li 2021). In fact, the joint statement between the United States and South Korea during President Moon’s visit to Washington in May 2021 includes the language that the two countries “... acknowledge the importance of open, transparent, and inclusive regional multilateralism including the Quad” (The White House 2021).

South Korea has much to bring to the table. First, it is a long-time military ally of the United States. While the focus of the alliance has historically been on the North Korean threats, the

Biden administration has sought to expand the scope of the alliance to be part of the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy to contain China (Yoon 2021). Second, South Korea has one of the most technologically advanced economies (Shiraishi and Truitt 2021), especially in the realm of semiconductor manufacturing, and the United States has urged Seoul to join its semiconductor export controls to China (Wilkins 2022). South Korea may also see various benefits in joining the Quad, chief among which may be “to further strengthen links with the U.S. and gain support for some of its foreign policy goals” (Pardo and Hwang 2021). However, such a move is likely to result in worsening of the relationship between Seoul and Beijing, generating economic and geopolitical costs to South Korea.

In 2021, China accounted for about 25% of South Korea’s exports, followed by the U.S. at 15%, prompting Korean analysts to warn of heavy export dependency on China in some of the country’s high-tech industries (Jung 2022). The potential economic costs of joining the Quad and thus being perceived by China as aligning with the United States to undermine China’s interests can be substantial. Between 2016 and 2017, China imposed economic sanctions on some of South Korean industries following the country’s deployment of the THAAD, forcing Lotte Group—one of the largest South Korean multinational corporations—to exit the Chinese market and dealing severe blows to South Korean tourism and entertainment industries that were heavily reliant on the Chinese market (Kim 2020; Lim and Ferguson 2022; Meick and Salidjanova 2017). The episode continues to cast a long shadow over political discourse in South Korea (Park 2022).

Thus far, South Korea has adopted a hedging strategy like the Southeast Asian nations—engaging in close security cooperation with the U.S., while strengthening economic ties with China (Heydarian 2017; Kuik 2016; Lee 2020; Murphy 2017; Park forthcoming). However, this balancing act may become more difficult to sustain as trade and technological conflict between the two great powers are intensifying. It is conceivable that in the coming years the wiggle room for South Korea will shrink, and the country may be under increasing pressure to join the Quad to align its foreign policy further with the United States. However, such a move will predictably antagonize China, and the two countries’ economic and diplomatic relations will likely suffer.

3. Gauging Public Support for the Quad

While leaders ultimately make foreign policy decisions, as we argued earlier, domestic politics can play an important role in the direction of a country’s foreign policy. In March 2022, Yoon Suk-yeol, the newly elected South Korean president, won “South Korea’s tightest race since it began holding free presidential elections in 1987,” with fewer than 300,000 votes over his main opponent (Choe 2022). With a weak domestic foundation to begin his presidency, Yoon may need to be particularly attentive to public opinion on Seoul’s relations with both Pyongyang and Beijing, the issues on which there is a high degree of domestic polarization (Kim 2022). After all, leaders must stay in power to derive benefits of the office or implementing their preferred policies, and the South Korean public holds a recent record of deposing a sitting president by protests (Choe 2017). Moreover, Yoon made two China-related pledges during his campaign: the additional deployment of THAAD and a move toward membership in the Quad (Kine 2022, Yoon 2022). Since taking office, his government has been cautious in taking actions to

implement these pledges (Shin 2022), perhaps carefully weighing the costs and benefits, as well as public reactions.

Most existing public opinion surveys about foreign policy issues in South Korea, such as the Pew Global Attitudes Survey and the Genron NPO polls, focus on broad questions such as the public's perceptions of China and the United States, South Korea's bilateral relations with the two countries, and opinions issues of peace and conflict in Northeast Asia (Kudo 2016; Silver et al. 2022; Turcsanyi et al. 2022). One exception is a recent survey of South Korean public opinion on ROK-U.S. bilateral ties commissioned by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies. Conducted in May 2022, the survey contained a question that gauged how the public thought about South Korea joining the Quad, revealing that 86% of the respondents supported South Korea's participation in the Quad (Kim, Kang, and Ham 2022).¹ The strikingly high support for Quad seems to suggest that the majority of South Koreans are choosing the security benefits from the U.S. over the economic costs of enraging China. However, because the question regarding the Quad membership was embedded in a long survey that was primarily focused on the ROK-U.S. alliance, there are reasons to believe that the design might have inflated the degree of support.²

Our survey design focuses on the Quad issue with no other leading questions. More importantly, to better identify how South Koreans weigh the security and economic trade-off in joining the Quad, we used a survey experiment that randomly assigns respondents to a control condition in which they read general information about the Quad and three treatment conditions where they are *explicitly* reminded of the (1) security benefits; (2) economic costs; or (3) both the security benefits and economic costs of joining the Quad. This design leads to the following two straightforward hypotheses that pertain to our discussions earlier about the trade-off:³

H1: *Those reminded of the security benefits of the Quad are more likely to support South Korea joining the Quad.*

H2: *Those reminded of the potential economic sanctions from Beijing are less likely to support South Korea joining the Quad.*

¹ The exact wording of the question was: "What do you think about South Korea joining the QUAD?" The response options were: "Very Positive"; "Positive on the Whole"; "Negative on the Whole"; "Very Negative"; "Don't Know/Refused".

² Specifically, the Quad question was preceded by over a dozen questions that heavily primed respondents about the significance of South Korea's alliance with the U.S. and the threat posed by China. It is therefore plausible that the support could be lower if respondents were given equal opportunity to consider the economic costs of a Quad membership. As a matter of fact, the very next question about deploying additional THAAD system received a much lower support of 57%, likely because the respondents were more aware of the potential costs from the previous episode.

³ Study number [details removed to facilitate anonymous peer review] is pre-registered with the Center for Open Science. The [Name of University Removed for Peer Review] Institutional Review Board approved this experiment in Study ID: [Removed for Peer Review]. The survey also included unrelated treatment conditions for the purposes of a separate study.

For the third treatment condition, we do not have *a priori* expectation regarding the net effect of the two primes, but it is reasonable to expect that the effects of being reminded of both the security benefits and economic costs will depend on the relative importance placed on the two by the individual:

H3: *The net effect of being reminded of both the security benefits and economic costs depends on the relative importance placed on the two by the individual.*

This hypothesis suggests two conditional treatment effects in opposite directions. Specifically, when primed with both the security benefits and economic costs of the Quad, those who view China as a security threat should be more likely to support South Korea joining the Quad. Conversely, those who depend more on China for their job and livelihood should be less likely to support South Korea joining the Quad.

4. Survey Design

We designed and administered our survey between April and June 2022 through dataSpring, a survey firm in South Korea. The company maintains an online panel of respondents in South Korea that take surveys in exchange for small cash payments. Respondents for the sample were drawn randomly from the online panel using a quota sampling strategy that targets pre-specified proportions of gender, age group, and geographic location, based on the latest census. Each of the solicited respondents was provided a link by the firm that redirects them to the survey as well as the consent information, hosted at the Qualtrics server in Canada. Upon completing the survey, they were redirected back to the company's website to claim their reward.

The survey experiment proceeds as follows. First, each respondent read a short paragraph on the background of the Quad:

“The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, also known as the Quad, is an organization between the United States, Japan, Australia, and India that is widely viewed as intending to counter China's growing economic and military power. China, which is the number one trading partner of South Korea, has criticized the Quad for inciting discord among countries in Asia.”

They further read that “South Korea has been invited to join the Quad.”

Next, respondents are randomly assigned either the control group or one of the three treatment groups, in which they received an additional message priming them with either the security benefits or the economic costs, or both, as detailed below:

Security Benefits: The United States maintains that South Korea's membership would further strengthen the alliance relationship between South Korea and the United States.

Economic Costs: China has warned that if South Korea joins the Quad, it will retaliate with strong economic sanctions.

Combined: The US maintains that South Korea’s membership would further strengthen the alliance relationship between South Korea and the United States. China has warned that if South Korea joins the Quad, it will retaliate with strong economic sanctions.

Finally, respondents were asked “How much do you agree or disagree with the idea that South Korea should join the Quad?” The answers are on a five-point scale from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” and are our main outcome measures.

To gain insights on the rationale behind the answers beyond the key trade-off, we posted a post-treatment open-ended question for a portion of our correspondents: “Please write a few words about why you either agree or disagree with the idea that South Korea should join the Quad.” The survey also includes standard demographic and attitudinal questions to measure the socioeconomic status of the respondents, and the degree of nationalism.⁴

5. Findings

Between April 13 and July 7, a total of 2,235 respondents successfully completed our survey. To improve data quality, we removed those who spent less than three minutes on the survey, resulting in a final sample size of 1,926. Quota sampling ensured our sample is representative with respect to key demographic characteristics of age, gender, and geographic distribution. Specifically, the average age of the respondents is 45 and the male/female ratio is 51%/49%, and around 67% have college degrees. Moreover, 23.7% of the respondents have a monthly income less than 3 million won, and 30.2% have an income over 6 million won, and 46.1% of the respondents fall in the middle-income group. These figures are rather similar to the 2021 census population.⁵

Figure 1 displays the overall distribution of the responses to the question: “How much do you agree or disagree with the idea that South Korea should join the Quad?” in the control group—those respondents who were not primed with any additional information. The median response was neither agree nor disagree, with 33% in the group. Slightly more (34.9%) answered somewhat agree and a further 13.7% strongly supported the idea. Combined, a little less than half of respondents (48.6%) supported South Korea joining the Quad. The result suggests that many South Koreans are ambivalent about joining the Quad, as captured by the neutral response.

⁴ See Appendix for exact wording of the questionnaire.

⁵ In the 2021 census population, the average age of South Koreans is 43.5 with a 50-50 gender ratio. 51.7% of the South Korean adult population have college degrees and 35.2% of the respondents have a monthly income less than 3 million won, and 29.4% have an income over 6 million won.




Figure 1: *Support for Joining the Quad.*

Note: The distribution is calculated for the control group (N = 471).

Treatment Effects

How did the information priming affect respondent support for joining the Quad? To answer this question and test our hypotheses, we estimated the average treatment effects (ATEs) by comparing the means of the outcome variable across the control and treatment conditions in a regression model. For ease of interpretation, the responses to the question of whether South Korea should join the Quad are rescaled as binary, with '1' indicating agreement with joining the Quad and '0' disagreement. The results are presented in Figure 2. While the treatment effects of security benefits and economic costs are both in the expected directions, neither achieves statistical significance. That is, our H1 and H2 are not supported.⁶ The average treatment effect of reminding respondents of both security benefit and economic costs of joining the Quad also did not make a difference; however, as we state in our third hypothesis, the net effect of the combined treatment may depend on the relative importance that individuals place on the two issues.

⁶ These results are similar when we adjust for covariates (age, gender, education, income, party affiliation, and nationalism).




Figure 2: *Average Treatment Effect of Security and Economic Primes*

Note: Point estimates based on a linear probability model represent treatment effects relative to the control condition, with positive numbers indicating more support for South Korea joining the Quad. Inner confidence intervals indicate 90 percent robust confidence intervals and outer confidence intervals at 95 percent. Control (n=471); Security benefits (n=459); Economic costs (n=507); Combined (n=484).

We asked several pre-treatment questions to measure the relative importance that respondents place on the security benefits and economic costs. For the perceived security benefits from joining the Quad, we asked respondents about their perceptions of China, Japan, and North Korea as a security threat, respectively. Specifically, the perceptions were measured using their responses to “In your opinion, how threatening is China/Japan/North Korea to South Korean national security?” on a seven-point scale. The order of the three countries was randomized. For each country, we coded respondents as having “low” threat perception for those who answered, “neither threatening nor unthreatening,” “somewhat unthreatening,” “unthreatening,” or “very unthreatening.” Those who answered, “somewhat threatening,” “threatening,” or “very threatening” were coded as having a “high” threat perception of China. In the case of China, in total, 81% of the respondents answered that China was at least “somewhat threatening,” with 35.3% and 23.3% answering “threatening” or “very threatening.”

We used several questions to gauge potential costs for individuals if China retaliates South Korea economically for joining the Quad. First, we asked respondents to identify their sector of employment. We coded those working in the following sectors to be more dependent on China for their jobs: “Arts and Entertainment”, “Accommodation”, and “Transportation.” These were the industries that were hit the hardest by Chinese economic sanctions against South Korea over the deployment of THAAD in 2016 (Lim and Ferguson 2022). Next, we asked respondents if their jobs deal with Chinese businesses and customers either directly or indirectly. For those that said “yes,” we further asked them how frequently they deal with Chinese businesses and customers, with the answers ranging from “very frequently” to “very rarely.” Finally, to see how much respondents depended on Chinese exports for their own livelihood, we asked them to estimate how much of the products and goods they purchase and use every day is made in China. The choices are “almost none,” “less than 25%,” “25% - 50%,” and “greater than 50%.”

In terms of economic dependency, 6.5% of the sample indicated that they worked in industries that are most vulnerable to China. In addition, 18.4% of respondents in the sample indicated that their jobs dealt with Chinese businesses or customers either directly or indirectly, and 13% answered that more than 50% of their daily products and goods were made in China. We combined information from these three questions to create a combined measure of economic dependency on China (*China Dependent*) that ranges from 0 to 1, with 0.29 as the average value.⁷

Figure 3 presents the conditional average treatment effects (CATEs) by subgroups. Panel (A) shows that regardless of whether individuals thought China was highly threatening or not, being reminded of security benefits or economic costs did not significantly affect their level of support for joining the Quad. Similarly, the treatment conditions did not deter support for the Quad for those individuals with high economic dependency on China even when they had received the condition reminding them of the economic costs of joining the Quad. Thus, our H3 is also not supported.

⁷ This measure was created by adding the value of three China economic dependence variables and then taking the average (dividing by 3) to scale the value between 0 and 1. The three variables used are: a binary measure of whether respondents dealt with Chinese businesses and customers, a binary measure of whether respondents worked in a China dependent industry, and a 4-point ordinal measure of how much they were reliant on Chinese consumer goods, which was divided by 4 to give equal weight with the previous measures. Thus 0 indicates no reliance on China by any of the three variables, while 1 indicates heavy reliance on China on all three variables.




Figure 3: *Conditional Average Treatment Effects by Individual's Threat Perception & Economic Dependence*

So why do we not observe a treatment effect, either when averaged together or when examined separately by individuals' personal security or economic considerations? There are several reasons why this might be the case. First, the sample sizes may not be large enough to have enough power to detect small treatment effects. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the respondents might have already been richly exposed to similar information prior to taking part in our survey, especially because joining the Quad was one of Yoon's campaign pledges, and thus our treatments were not providing additional information to our respondents. Nevertheless, even if we restrict the sample size to those who said that they had not paid close attention to the Quad (71% of the sample), the results are similar. This suggests that beyond the potential issues of small sample size and weak treatment, other individual attributes may provide more powerful explanations for the attitudes toward the Quad in the case of South Korea, which has long been dealing with security challenges from more powerful neighbors. We now turn to examining what individual characteristics are significantly correlated with one's attitude toward joining the Quad using a battery of both sociodemographic and attitudinal questions in the survey.

The Effects of Individual Characteristics on the Support for Quad

Table 1 presents the results from a linear probability model (LPM) with robust standard errors. We highlight three main findings.⁸ First, we find that people's threat perceptions toward China, North Korea, and Japan are strong predictors of their attitudes toward the Quad. Those who felt more threatened by China and North Korea were more likely to support joining the Quad, while

⁸ The LPM is a special case of a binary regression model with the dependent variable dichotomized as described above. The results are similar when we use a logit model. See Table A1 in the appendix for more detail.

those who felt more threatened by Japan were less likely to support joining a coalition where Japan was already a member of. The effects were also substantively large: for example, someone who felt very threatened by China was 46.8% more likely to support joining the Quad compared to someone who felt very unthreatened by China. Second, surprisingly, we find that an individual’s level of economic dependency on China, such as being employed in jobs that deal with China, affiliation with industries vulnerable to Chinese sanctions, or heavy use of Chinese manufactured goods (*China Dependent*), does not play a role in determining support for the Quad. The variable is insignificant when tested against the dependent variable without controls, or when each component of the China Dependent variable is tested separately.

Third, partisanship emerges as a strong predictor. Even after controlling for the respondent’s level of threat perceptions toward China (*China Threat*), as well as pride toward the Korean nation (*nationalism*), party identity remained a powerful determinant. Specifically, compared to the baseline category (Independents), supporters of the People’s Power Party (PPP), the party of the incumbent President Yoon Suk-yeol, were 15.6% more likely to support joining the Quad while supporters of the Minjoo Party, the main rival party of PPP, were 6.1% less likely to support the U.S.-led grouping. Although the importance of partisanship as a determinant is not surprising given how foreign relations with China and the United States are heavily politicized in South Korean domestic politics (Moon and Boo 2017), it is interesting how partisanship dominates individual self-interest considerations, especially in light of the existing literature which emphasizes the importance of individual self-interest in determining foreign policy preferences (Scheve and Slaughter 2001).

For the remaining control variables, Table 1 shows that the respondent’s level of education, gender, and region are significant predictors. More highly educated individuals, males, and those living in major cities (one of South Korea’s eight metropolitan cities including Seoul) indicated a higher willingness to support the U.S.-led coalition. While the exact reason is beyond the scope of this study, it is possible that males are more comfortable with supporting aggressive policies that revise the status quo (Eichenberg 2016), while highly educated, urban residents display a more pro-U.S. attitude because they are more likely to have been exposed to U.S. related experiences during their work or education.

Table 1 Individual Determinants of Support for Quad

Explanatory Variable	
Alliance Condition	0.033 (0.034)
China Condition	-0.025 (0.033)
Combined Condition	0.021 (0.034)
Age	-0.001 (0.001)
Education	0.023* (0.014)

Male	0.050**
	(0.025)
Party ID: Minjoo	-0.061**
	(0.030)
Party ID: PPP	0.156***
	(0.030)
Income	0.003
	(0.006)
China Dependent	0.044
	(0.066)
China Threat	0.078***
	(0.012)
North Korea Threat	0.049***
	(0.011)
Japan Threat	-0.062***
	(0.008)
Urban	-0.044*
	(0.024)
Nationalism	0.063***
	(0.018)
Know Quad	-0.004
	(0.025)
Constant	-0.274**
	(0.109)
Observations	1,533
R2	0.153
Adjusted R2	0.144

Note: Baseline category for Party Identity is Independents (41% of the sample). Ideology and Nationalism are on a 5-point scale, with higher values indicating more conservative attitudes and stronger levels of nationalism. See Appendix XX for questions used to measure these values.
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Open-ended Answers

The open-ended questions provided additional insights regarding the reasoning behind individuals' responses to the Quad question. A subset of our sample (n=770, 40%) responded by writing a couple of sentences on why they chose to either agree, disagree, or neither agree nor

disagree with joining the Quad. Sifting through the response, we noticed several interesting patterns.

First, considerations about China played the biggest role in determining whether individuals chose to support or oppose across all treatment conditions, even among those who were only reminded of U.S. security guarantees (Figure 4). This, to some extent, supports our conjecture that our priming treatments might have been too weak because the informational environment in which our respondents reside was already saturated with Quad-relevant discussions. Specifically, respondents who supported joining the Quad agreed because they thought China was a security threat, while respondents who opposed joining the Quad did so because they were afraid it would



Figure 4 Frequency of words in open-ended question

upset China. In fact, the single most mentioned word was “China (중국)” – 286 times---almost six times more than the U.S. (50). In other words, respondents cared more about what positive or negative ramifications joining the Quad would have regarding China-South Korea relations than to U.S-South Korea relations. North Korea and Japan did not play a big role, being mentioned only 30 and 15 times, respectively.

Second, “protection of Korean sovereignty” was one of the most common rationales given by both supporters and opposers of the Quad. For example, that the United States offers to strengthen the alliance ties between the two countries was interpreted by some people as disrespectful of Korean agency, as evidenced by answers such as “We don’t always have to do what the U.S. wants;” “South Korea is not a U.S. vassal state;” “South Korea should do what is best for its own interests, not for U.S. interests.” Similarly, China’s threats of economic retaliation also backfired on many respondents, who thought “China is bullying us again” and pushed the respondents toward supporting the Quad despite the higher economic costs. This concern for sovereignty may be yet another reason why the treatment conditions were not effective in changing people’s beliefs as we hypothesized: the (dis)incentives provided by either China or the U.S. in our survey design, which

mimics the real-world scenarios, were counterproductive for some respondents as they interpreted the two countries to be interfering with Korean sovereignty.

Lastly, the open-ended responses indicate that for some individuals there are other aspects of joining the Quad that are appealing, such as raising South Korea's status in the world by joining an alliance of democratic states. About 8% of the individuals who indicated their support for the Quad gave answers such as "to raise South Korea's status in the world" or "to tell the world that South Korea is part of advanced/ democratic countries." This resonates with the official rhetoric by the South Korean President Moon who echoed the Biden administration's characterization of the Quad as a grouping of democracies in his 2021 visit to Washington. Expectations of such other benefits, apart from the security benefits or economic costs of the Quad *per se*, may also be a reason why the treatment conditions were not as effective as hypothesized and worth exploring in the future.

6. Conclusion

The intense competition between China and the United States for global influence has created a foreign policy dilemma for many third countries: they are often expected to declare their positions on an issue that could be interpreted as joining the side of one superpower against the other. This pressure to take sides has been the greatest in Asia, where there are many countries who are traditional allies of the United States but have also been deeply intertwined with China economically. No country embodies this dilemma more than South Korea, whose military alliance with the United States is among the strongest of its kind and its economic dependence on China is extensive. Lurking in the background is also the North Korean nuclear threat that requires the cooperation of both superpowers to manage. Therefore, the space for South Korea to navigate the triangular relationship is narrow, and yet its alignment decision will have significant implications, both substantively and symbolically, for South Korea as well as U.S.-China competition more broadly.

Adding to the challenge is South Korean domestic politics where the public has had a history of holding politicians accountable, including successful protests that resulted in President Park Geun-hye's removal from office in 2017 (Choe 2017). Given the unprecedented narrow margin of victory with which the current President Yoon Suk-yeol came into office and his low approval rating thus far, hovering below 40%, how the public may view a key foreign policy decision will no doubt figure into his administration's consideration. With the importance of domestic politics in mind, this research investigates South Korean public's attitudes toward the prospect of joining the Quad, a decision that is likely to be widely interpreted as choosing the side of the United States against China.

We find that close to majority (48.6%) of our sample respondents support joining the Quad, yet the reasons for their attitudes did not follow the logic of security-economics tradeoff that has been widely observed in Southeast Asia. Specifically, our security treatment, which reminded the respondents of the security benefit from a closer alliance relationship with the US did not have the effect of increasing support for joining the Quad. Similarly, reminding respondents of the economic costs of joining the Quad did not lead to lower support for joining the Quad. In other

words, the perceived benefits of the Quad might not lie in the additional security guarantee provided by the United States.

Instead, we find that individuals' threat perceptions and party identification are the two strongest predictors of their support for Quad: those who felt more threatened by China and North Korea were more likely to support joining the Quad, as are those who support President Yoon's party. In other words, individuals' beliefs about South Korea's security environment and political ideologies play a bigger role in determining respondents' alignment preferences between the two superpowers. Combined with the finding that additional security guarantee from the United States did not increase support for joining the Quad, this result suggests that perhaps some respondents saw additional security benefit from being part of the group. On the other hand, those who perceived Japan to be a threat were less likely to support joining the Quad, perhaps because Japan is a member of the club.

An additional insight emerged from the open-ended responses: "protection of Korean sovereignty" was the most common reason given by both supporters and opposers of the Quad. A largely overlooked component of nationalism in Asia, including South Korea, is a strong preference for foreign policy independence stemming from colonial experiences of the countries losing sovereignty and thus autonomy in decision making (Lee 2007). We see this pattern from regional leaders' refusal to take sides in the great power competition, and the choice of a hedging strategy prevailing in Southeast Asia. Such sentiments seem to resonate with our South Korean respondents as well. Many respondents in our survey might have viewed the suggestion of either an even closer security alignment with the US, or the threat of economic sanctions by China as a lack of respect for Korean sovereignty. It remains to be seen how significant this preference for foreign policy autonomy is compared with other drivers of South Korean public attitudes toward joining the Quad.

References

Choe, Sang-Hun. 2022. Yoon Suk-yeol, South Korean Conservative Leader, Wins Presidency." *The New York Times*, March 9. <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/09/world/asia/south-korea-election-yoon-suk-yeol.html>. Accessed on February 2, 2023.

CSIS [Center for Strategic and International Studies]. 2022. "Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh Ahead of U.S.–ASEAN Summit." Transcript, May 11. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/prime-minister-pham-minh-chinh-ahead-us-asean-summit>. Accessed on February 2, 2023.

DOD [The U.S. Department of Defense]. 2018. "Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of The United States of America." January 19. <https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf>. Accessed on February 2, 2023.

- DOD [The U.S. Department of Defense]. 2022. "Fact Sheet: 2022 National Defense Strategy." October 27. <https://media.defense.gov/2022/Mar/28/2002964702/-1/-1/1/NDS-FACT-SHEET.PDF>. Accessed on February 2, 2023.
- Eichenberg, Richard. 2016. Gender Difference in American Public Opinion on the Use of Military Force, 1982–2013, *International Studies Quarterly*, Volume 60, Issue 1, 138–148.
- Fang, Songying, and Xiaojun Li. 2022. "Southeast Asia under Great-Power Competition: Public Opinion About Hedging in the Philippines." *Journal of East Asian Studies* 22 (3): 481–501.
- Fang, Songying, Xiaojun Li and Adam Y Liu. 2022. "Chinese Public Opinion about US–China Relations from Trump to Biden." *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 15 (1): 27-46.
- Govella, Kristi, Garima Mohan, and Bonnie Glaser. 2022. "Expanding Engagement among South Korea and the Quad Countries in the Indo-Pacific." *The German Marshall Fund of the United States*, June 2022. <https://www.gmfus.org/news/expanding-engagement-among-south-korea-and-quad-countries-indo-pacific>. Accessed on February 2, 2023.
- Heydarian, Richard Javad. 2017. "Tragedy of Small Power Politics: Duterte and the Shifting Sands of Philippine Foreign Policy." *Asian Security* 13 (3): 220–236.
- Hosokawa, Kotaro, and Taisei Hoyama. 2022. "U.S. Chip Alliance Against China Tests South Korea's Loyalty." *Nikkei Asia*, September 24. <https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Tech/Semiconductors/U.S.-chip-alliance-against-China-tests-South-Korea-s-loyalty>. Accessed on February 2, 2023.
- Jung, Min-kyung. 2022. "South Korea's Exports to China Jump 162-fold Over 30 Years." *The Korea Herald*, August 23. <https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20220823000680>. Accessed on February 2, 2023.
- Kemp, Ted. 2021. "The 'Quad' Is on the Rise in Asia-Pacific: Game Theory Has a Prediction about Its Future." *CNBC*, September 23. <https://www.cnbc.com/quad-summit-and-china-game-theory-predictions-for-the-future-of-the-quad/>. Accessed on February 2, 2023.
- Kim, J. James, Chungku Kang, and Geon Hee Ham. 2022. "South Korean Public Opinion on ROK-U.S. Bilateral Ties." *Asan Report*, May. <https://en.asaninst.org/contents/south-korean-public-opinion-on-rok-u-s-bilateral-ties/>. Accessed on February 2, 2023.
- Kim, Victoria. 2020. "When China and U.S. Spar, It's South Korea That Gets Punched." *The Los Angeles Times*, November 20. <https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2020-11-19/south-korea-china-beijing-economy-thaad-missile-interceptor>. Accessed on February 2, 2023.
- Kim Yoo-chul. 2022. "Has Yoon's Approval Rating Bottomed Out?" *The Korean Times*, November 22. https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2022/12/356_341955.html. Accessed on February 2, 2023.

Kine, Phelim. 2021. "South Korea's 'Maverick' New President Rides Tough-on-China Platform to Victory." *Politico*, March 10. <https://www.politico.com/news/2022/03/09/south-koreas-yoon-suk-yeol-new-president-china-00015960>. Accessed on February 2, 2023.

Kudo, Yasushi. 2016. "Japan-China-ROK Opinion Polls Reveal Views on Future of Northeast Asia." Genron NPO, November 13, 2016. https://www.genron-npo.net/en/opinion_polls/archives/5320.html. Accessed on February 2, 2023.

Kuik, Cheng-Chwee. 2016. "How Do Weaker States Hedge? Unpacking ASEAN States' Alignment Behavior Towards China." *Journal of Contemporary China* 25 (100): 500-514.

Kuik, Cheng-Chwee. 2022. "Shades of grey: riskification and hedging in the Indo-Pacific." *The Pacific Review*: 1-34.

Lee, Dong Sun. 2007. "Democratization and the US-South Korean Alliance." *Journal of East Asian Studies* 7(3): 469-499.

Lee, Ji-Young. 2020. "The Geopolitics of South Korea-China Relations: Implications for U.S. Policy in the Indo-Pacific." *RAND Corporation*. <https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA524-1.html>. Accessed on February 2, 2023.

Lee, Haneul, Tobias Harris, and Alan Yu. 2022. "Rising Anti-China Sentiment in South Korea Offers Opportunities To Strengthen US-ROK Relations." *The Center for American Progress*, August 2. <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/rising-anti-china-sentiment-in-south-korea-offers-opportunities-to-strengthen-us-rok-relations/>. Accessed on February 2, 2023.

Li, Jason. 2021. "South Korea's Formal Membership in the Quad Plus: A Bridge Too Far." *The Stimson Center*, October 4. <https://www.stimson.org/2021/south-koreas-formal-membership-in-the-quad-plus-a-bridge-too-far/>. Accessed on February 2, 2023.

Lim, Darren J., and Victor A. Ferguson. 2022. "Informal Economic Sanctions: The Political Economy of Chinese Coercion During the THAAD Dispute." *Review of International Political Economy* 29 (5): 1525-1548.

Lin, Minwang. 2022. "China's Evolving Perspectives on the Quad." *East Asian Policy* 14 (3): 5-16.

Madan, Tanvi. 2017. "The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of the 'Quad.'" *War on the Rocks*, November 16. <https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/rise-fall-rebirth-quad/>. Accessed on February 2, 2023.

Meick, Ethan, and Nargiza Salidjanova. 2017. "China's Response to U.S.-South Korean Missile Defense System Deployment and its Implications." *U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission*, July 26. https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Report_China's%20Response%20to%20THAAD%20Deployment%20and%20its%20Implications.pdf. Accessed on February 2, 2023.

Mohan, C. Raja. 2022. "Why China Is Paranoid About the Quad." *Foreign Policy*. May 17. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/17/india-china-quad-summit-modi-xi-biden/>. Accessed on February 2, 2023.

Moon, Chung-In, and Boo Seung-chan. 2016. Coping with China's rise. *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics*. Vol.2(1) 3-23.

Morford, Stacy. 2022. "The Quad: US Efforts to Counter China's Influence in Asia Mark a New Era of Micro Alliances." *The Conversation*, June 1. <https://theconversation.com/the-quad-us-efforts-to-counter-chinas-influence-in-asia-mark-a-new-era-of-micro-alliances-183956>. Accessed on February 2, 2023.

Murphy, Ann Marie. 2017. "Great Power Rivalries, Domestic Politics and Southeast Asian Foreign Policy: Exploring the Linkages." *Asian Security* 13(3): 165–182.

Na, Erika. 2022. South Korea's Supply Chain Reliance on China Leaves It More Exposed Than the US, Japan: Report." *The South China Morning Post*, January 13. <https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3163101/south-koreas-supply-chain-reliance-china-leaves-it-more>. Accessed on February 2, 2023.

Panda, Ankit. 2018. "With an Eye on Great Power Conflict, US Defense Department Releases 2018 National Defense Strategy." *The Diplomat*, January 21. <https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/with-an-eye-on-great-power-conflict-us-defense-department-releases-2018-national-defense-strategy/>. Accessed on February 2, 2023.

Panda, Jagannath. 2022. "Making 'Quad Plus' a Reality." *The Diplomat*, January 13. <https://thediplomat.com/2022/01/making-quad-plus-a-reality/>. Accessed on February 2, 2023.

Park, Joshua. 2022. "South Korea's First Trade Deficit with China: Stirrings in the Global Tech Sector." *Center for Strategic & International Studies*, August 3. <https://www.csis.org/blogs/new-perspectives-asia/south-koreas-first-trade-deficit-china-stirrings-global-tech-sector>. Accessed on February 2, 2023.

Park, Jae Jeok. forthcoming. "The US-led security network in the Indo-Pacific in international order transition: a South Korean perspective." *The Pacific Review*. 10.1080/09512748.2022.2160790. Accessed on February 2, 2023.

Pardo, Ramon Pacheco, and Jihwan Hwang. 2021. "Seoul Sees Hope in Biden's North Korea Approach." *The Hill*, March 8. <https://thehill.com/opinion/international/541610-seoul-sees-hope-in-bidens-north-korea-approach/>. Accessed on February 2, 2023.

Scheve, K. F., & Slaughter, M. J. 2001. Labor Market Competition and Individual Preferences over Immigration Policy. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 83(1), 133–145.

Shiraishi, Togo, and Jack Stone Truitt. 2021. "South Korea Cracks World's Top 5 Innovators While China Edges Japan." *Nikkei Asia*, September 21.
<https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Technology/South-Korea-cracks-world-s-top-5-innovators-while-China-edges-Japan>. Accessed on February 2, 2023.

Silver, Laura, Christine Huang, and Laura Clancy. 2022. "Negative Views of China Tied to Critical Views of Its Policies on Human Rights". Pew Research Center, June 29, 2022.
<https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2022/06/29/negative-views-of-china-tied-to-critical-views-of-its-policies-on-human-rights/>.

Sochan, Ry. 2022. "PM: Neutral in US-China Ties." *Phnom Penh Post*, May 12.
<https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national-politics/pm-neutral-us-china-ties>. Accessed on February 2, 2023.

Son, Ji-hyong. 2022. "Seoul Weighs 'Chip 4' Alliance as Ties with China Hang in Balance." *The Korean Herald*, August 8.
<https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20220808000653>. Accessed on February 2, 2023.

The Straits Times. 2022. "US, ASEAN to Upgrade Ties; Singapore PM Says This Shows US Values Its Partnership with ASEAN." *Inquirer*, May 15.
<https://globalnation.inquirer.net/204011/us-asean-to-upgrade-ties-singapore-pm-says-this-shows-us-values-its-partnership-with-asean>. Accessed on February 2, 2023.

Tonnesson, Stein. 2016. "Will Nationalism Drive Conflict in Asia?" *Nations and Nationalism* 22 (2): 232–242.

Turcsanyi, Richard Q., Klara Dubravcikova, Su-Jeong Kang, James Iocovozzi, Matej Simalcik, Lucia Husenicova, South Korean public opinion on the world in times of global turmoil: US yay, China nay, Japan meh, Palacky University Olomouc, September 2022. ISBN: 978–80–8239–008–0.

Vu, Tuong. 2013. "Southeast Asia's New Nationalism: Causes and Significance." *TRaNS: Transnational and Regional Studies of Southeast Asia* 1:2 (July 2013), 259-279.

USIP [United States Institute of Peace]. 2019. "China's Role in North Korea Nuclear and Peace Negotiations." May 19. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2019-04/chinas_role_in_north_korea_nuclear_and_peace_negotiations.pdf. Accessed on February 2, 2023.

The White House. 2021. "U.S.-ROK Leaders' Joint Statement." May 21.
<https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/05/21/u-s-rok-leaders-joint-statement/>. Accessed on February 2, 2023.

The White House. 2022. “Quad Joint Leaders’ Statement.” May 24. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/24/quad-joint-leaders-statement/>. Accessed on February 2, 2023.

Wilkins, Rebecca Choong. 2022. “China Courts South Korea as US Chips Campaign Gains Steam.” *Bloomberg*, December 12. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-12-13/china-courts-south-korea-as-us-chips-campaign-gains-steam?leadSource=verify%20wall>. Accessed on February 2, 2023.

Work, Clint. 2022a. “No More Delays: Why It’s Time to Move Forward with Wartime OPCON Transition.” *38 North Special Report*, June. https://www.stimson.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/22-06-Clint-Work-OPCON_FINAL.pdf. Accessed on February 2, 2023.

Work, Clint. 2022b. “The Tensions Within South Korea’s Indo-Pacific Strategy.” *The Korea Economic Institute of America*, December 7. <https://keia.org/the-peninsula/the-tensions-within-south-koreas-indo-pacific-strategy/>. Accessed on February 2, 2023.

World Bank. World Integrated Trade Solution. [WITS]. <https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/KOR/StartYear/2000/EndYear/2019/TradeFlow/Export/Partner/CHN/Indicator/XPRT-PRTNR-SHR>. Accessed on February 2, 2023.

Yoon, Sukjoon. 2021. “Like It or Not, the South Korea-US Alliance Is Changing.” *The Diplomacy*, August 27. <https://thediplomat.com/2021/08/like-it-or-not-the-south-korea-us-alliance-is-changing/>. Accessed on February 2, 2023.

Yoon, Suk-yeol. 2022. South Korea Needs to Step UP. *Foreign Affairs*, February 8. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-korea/2022-02-08/south-korea-needs-step>. Accessed on February 2, 2023.

Yoon, Young-sil. 2022. “South Korea Excessively Dependent on China for Certain Items.” *South Business Korea*, July 6. <http://www.businesskorea.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=96007>. Accessed on February 2, 2023.

Online Appendix

Table A1 Individual Determinants of Support for Quad Using Logit

Explanatory Variable	
Alliance Condition	0.165 (0.163)
China Condition	-0.113 (0.158)
Combined Condition	0.114 (0.160)
Age	-0.004 (0.005)
Education	0.104 (0.064)
Male	0.219* (0.116)
Party ID: Minjoo	-0.264* (0.136)
Party ID: PPP	0.736*** (0.145)
Income	0.010 (0.029)
China Dependent	0.150 (0.318)
China Threat	0.387*** (0.062)
North Korea Threat	0.234*** (0.053)
Japan Threat	-0.312*** (0.044)
Urban	-0.212* (0.113)
Nationalism	0.301*** (0.087)
Know Quad	-0.017 (0.119)
Constant	-3.674*** (0.553)
Observations	1,533
Log Likelihood	-934.110
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,902.220

Survey Questionnaire (the English Version)

A. Demographics

How much do you know about the “Quadrilateral Security Dialogue”, also known as the “Quad ”?

- I have been paying close attention to it.
- I have heard of it but have not really paid attention.
- I have not heard of it.

[if “I have been paying close attention to it” or “I have heard of it but have not really paid attention.”] Please list all current members of the Quad

Who did you vote for in the presidential election?

- Yoon Suk-yeol
- Lee Jae-myung
- Others
- I did not vote
- Prefer not to answer

In which of the following industrial sectors do you work?

- Agriculture, forestry, fishing/hunting
- Mining, oil and gas extraction
- Utilities (electric power, natural gas distribution, water/sewage)
- Construction
- Manufacturing
- Wholesale trade (selling to retailers)
- Retail trade (selling to consumers)
- Transportation / warehousing
- Information and cultural industries (publishing, recording, broadcasting, telecom, data processing/hosting)
- Finance and insurance
- Real estate/rental
- Professional, scientific, technical (legal, accounting, architectural, computer systems design, management/scientific/technical consulting, scientific research, advertising)
- Management of companies (holding companies)
- Administrative/support, waste management (office administration, security, custodial, placement/temping services, collection agencies, travel agencies, waste collection/treatment)
- Education
- Academic/think tank
- Health care/social assistance
- Arts, entertainment, recreation (performing arts, sports, gaming, museums)
- Accommodation, food (hotels, bars, restaurants)
- Other services (auto/appliance repair, funeral services, dry cleaning/laundry, parking lots, pet care)
- Public administration (government)
- Other

Does your job deal with Chinese businesses and customers either directly or indirectly?

- Yes
- No
- Don't know/not sure

[if yes] How frequently do you deal with Chinese businesses and customers?

- Very frequently
- Somewhat frequently
- Once in a while
- Somewhat rarely
- Very rarely

Of the products and goods you purchase and use every day, how much is made in China? Please give a rough estimate:

- Almost none
- Less than 25%
- 25% - 50%
- Greater than 50%

In your opinion, how threatening is each of the following country to South Korean national security? (Very unthreatening – Very threatening, on a 7-point scale)

- A. China
- B. Japan
- C. North Korea

B. Prompt

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, also known as the Quad, is an organization between the United States, Japan, Australia and India that is widely viewed as intending to counter China's growing economic and military power. China, which is the number one trading partner of South Korea, has criticized the Quad for inciting discord among countries in Asia.

South Korea has been invited to join the Quad.

[Participants receive one of the four treatments below:]

- A. *Control*: NA
- B. *Combined*: The US maintains that South Korea's membership would further strengthen the alliance relationship between South Korea and the US. China has warned that if South Korea joins the Quad, it will retaliate with strong economic sanctions.
- C. *Alliance*: The US maintains that South Korea's membership would further strengthen the alliance relationship between South Korea and the US.
- D. *China*: China has warned that if South Korea joins the Quad, it will retaliate with strong economic sanctions.

[Asked on a 1-5 scale of Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree]:

- A. How much do you agree or disagree with the idea that South Korea should join the Quad?
- B. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? Joining the Quad would improve the image of South Korea as a democratic country.
- C. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? Joining the Quad would improve South Korea's status in the world.

[Open Ended]

Please write a few words about why you [agree/ disagree/ neither agree nor disagree] with the idea that South Korea should join the Quad.

C. Demographics:

What year were you born?

(Multiple choice from 1918-2003)

What is your gender?

- Male
- Female
- Other
- Prefer not to say

What is the current region you are living in?

- Seoul
- Busan
- Daegu
- Incheon
- Gwangju
- Daejeon
- Ulsan
- Gyeonggi
- Gangwon
- North Chungcheong
- South Chungcheong / Sejong
- North Jeolla
- South Jeolla
- North Gyeongsang
- South Gyeongsang
- Jeju
- Overseas

What is the highest level of education you have received?

- Less than high school degree
- High school graduate
- Currently pursuing or received an Associate degree in college
- Currently pursuing or received a Bachelor's degree in college
- Currently pursuing or received a graduate degree (Masters, J.D, Ph.D., M.D., etc.)
- Prefer not to answer

What is your religion, if any?

- Buddhism
- Protestantism
- Catholicism
- Islam
- Hinduism
- No religion
- Other
- Prefer not to answer

Which of the following best describes your political views?

- Liberal
- Slightly liberal
- Neither liberal nor conservative
- Slightly conservative
- Conservative
- Prefer not to answer

Which political party do you support the most?

- The Minjoo Party
- People Power Party
- Justice Party
- People's Party
- Other:
- None
- Prefer not to answer

Please give your best estimate of your household's monthly income in 2021 (pre-tax)

- Less than 990,000 KRW
- More than 1,000,000 KRW and less than 1,999,000 KRW
- More than 2,000,000 KRW and less than 2,999,000 KRW
- More than 3,000,000 KRW and less than 3,999,000 KRW
- More than 4,000,000 KRW and less than 4,999,000 KRW
- More than 5,000,000 KRW and less than 5,999,000 KRW
- More than 6,000,000 KRW and less than 6,999,000 KRW
- More than 7,000,000 KRW
- Prefer not to answer

How much attention do you pay to news about politics on TV, radio, printed newspapers, or the Internet?

- A great deal
- A lot
- A moderate amount
- A little
- None at all

How much do you agree with the following statements?

(5-point scale: Strongly Disagree – Strongly Agree)

A. I am very proud to be Korean.

B. I would rather be a citizen of South Korea than a citizen of any other country.

C. South Korea is the greatest country in the world.

D. I am proud of South Korea's history and culture.

E. South Korea should take care of its self-interests first, even if this means having conflict with other countries.

Survey Questionnaire in Korean (Shown to respondents)

가. 개인 속성

“4 차 안보 대화”, 혹은 줄여서 “쿼드” 에 대해서 얼마나 아십니까?

- 많은 관심이 있다
- 들어는 보았으나 많은 관심은 없다
- 들어보지 못했다

(쿼드에 대해 관심이 있거나 들어보았으면)

쿼드의 현재 멤버들을 모두 나열해 주십시오

귀하는 이번 대통령 선거에서 어떤 후보에게 투표하셨습니다?

- 윤석열
- 이재명
- 기타
- 투표하지 않음
- 답변하고 싶지 않음

어떤 산업 분야에서 일하십니까?

- 농업, 임업 및 어업
- 광업, 원유 및 천연가스 광업
- 공공사업 (전기, 가스, 증기 및 공기 조절 공급업, 수도, 하수 및 폐기물 처리)
- 건설업
- 제조업
- 도매업
- 소매업
- 운수 및 창고업
- 정보통신업 (출판업, 영상/오디오 기록물 제작 및 배급업, 방송업, 우편 및 통신업, 시스템 통합 및 관리업, 정보서비스업)
- 금융 및 보험업
- 부동산업
- 전문직, 과학 및 기술 서비스업(법, 회계, 건축 기술, 컴퓨터 엔지니어링, 경영/과학/기술 컨설팅, 과학 연구, 광고)
- 기업경영 (지주회사)
- 행정지원, 사업 시설 관리업 (업무 관리, 경비 및 경호, 사업 시설 관리업, 고용 알선 및 인력 공급업, 미수금 처리 서비스업, 여행사 및 여행 보조 서비스업, 폐기물 수집 처리업)
- 교육 서비스업
- 학자/싱크탱크
- 보건업 및 사회복지업
- 예술, 스포츠 및 여가관련 서비스업 (공연예술, 스포츠, 게임, 박물관)
- 숙박 및 요식업(호텔, 바, 음식점)
- 기타 서비스업 (차량 및 가전제품 수리업, 장례식 및 관련 서비스업, 세탁업, 주차장, 애완 동물 서비스업)
- 공공 행정 (정부 기관)
- 기타

귀하의 직업이 직접 또는 간접적으로 중국 기업과 고객을 상대하십니까?

- 그렇다
- 그렇지 않다
- 잘 모르겠다

얼마나 자주 중국 기업과 고객을 상대하십니까?

- 빈번하게 상대한다
- 다소 빈번하게 상대한다
- 가끔씩 상대한다
- 드물게 상대한다
- 극히 드물게 상대한다

귀하께서 자주 구매하시고 매일 또는 평상시에 사용하는 제품 중 중국산 제품은 얼마나 됩니까?
대략적인 수치를 선택해주시시오

- 거의 없다
- 25% 보다 적다
- 25% ~ 50% 이다
- 50% 이상이다

다음 국가들이 각각 한국의 국가 안보에 얼마나 위협적이라고 생각하십니까? (매우 위협적이지 않다 - 매우 위협적이다 7 단계)

- A. 중국
- B. 일본
- C. 북한

나. 설문 조건

쿼드(Quad) 라고도 알려진 4 자 안보 대화는 미국, 일본, 호주, 그리고 인도 사이의 기구로서, 중국의 증가하는 경제력과 군사력에 대항하기 위한 것으로 널리 알려져 있습니다. 한국의 제 1 무역 상대국인 중국은 쿼드가 아시아 국가들 간의 불화를 부추긴다고 비판했습니다. 한국은 쿼드에 참가하도록 초청 받았습니다.

(다음 중 한 가지 조건이 제시됨)

- A. 통제조건: 없음
- B. 안보조건: 미국은 한국의 쿼드 가입이 한미동맹을 더욱 공고히 할 것이라는 입장을 고수하고 있습니다.
- C. 경제조건: 중국은 한국이 쿼드에 가입한다면 강력한 경제 제재로 보복할 것이라고 경고했습니다.
- D. 안보경제조건: 미국은 한국의 쿼드 가입이 한미동맹을 더욱 공고히 할 것이라는 입장을 고수하고 있습니다. 한편, 중국은 한국이 쿼드에 가입한다면 강력한 경제 제재로 보복할 것이라고 경고했습니다.

귀하는 한국이 쿼드에 가입해야 한다는 의견에 얼마나 동의 또는 반대하십니까?

- 매우 반대한다
- 다소 반대한다
- 동의도 반대도 하지 않는다
- 다소 동의한다
- 매우 동의한다

귀하는 다음 문장에 얼마나 동의 또는 반대하십니까? (매우 반대한다 - 매우 동의한다 5 단계)

- A. 쿼드에 가입하는 것은 민주주의 국가로서의 한국의 이미지를 향상시킬 것이다.
- B. 쿼드에 가입하는 것은 세계에서 한국의 위상을 향상시킬 것이다.

[주관식]

한국이 쿼드에 가입해야 한다는 의견에 왜 [동의하는/ 반대하는/ 동의하지도 반대하지도 않는]지 간략하게 말씀해주십시오.

다. 개인정보

귀하는 몇 년도에 태어나셨습니까?
1918 부터 2003 까지 선택

귀하의 성별은 어떻게 되십니까?

- 남자
- 여자
- 기타
- 응답 거절

현재 살고 계신 지역은 어디입니까?

- 서울
- 부산
- 대구
- 인천
- 광주
- 대전
- 울산
- 경기도
- 강원도
- 충청북도
- 충청남도
- 전라북도
- 전라남도
- 경상북도
- 경상남도
- 제주도
- 외국

귀하는 학교를 어디까지 마치셨습니까?

- 고등학교 졸업 이하
- 고등학교 졸업
- 전문대학 재학/ 전문대학 졸업
- 대학 재학/ 대학졸업
- 대학원 재학 이상
- 잘 모르겠음

귀하의 종교는 어떻게 되십니까?

- 불교
- 개신교
- 천주교
- 이슬람교
- 힌두교
- 없음
- 기타
- 잘 모르겠음

귀하는 스스로의 정치 성향을 어떻게 평가하시나요?

- 진보
- 중도 진보
- 중도
- 중도 보수
- 보수
- 잘 모르겠음

귀하는 현재 어떤 정당을 가장 지지하시나요?

- 민주당
- 국민의 힘
- 정의당
- 국민의 당
- 기타
- 없음
- 잘 모르겠음

실례지만, 현재 함께 살고 계시는 가족 모두의 한 달 평균 총수입은 얼마 정도입니까? 저축, 임대소득, 이자 등을 모두 포함하여 세금을 공제하기 전의 가구 월평균 총수입을 말씀해주십시오.

- 월 99 만원 이하
- 월 100 ~ 199 만원
- 월 200 ~ 299 만원
- 월 300 ~ 399 만원
- 월 400 ~ 499 만원
- 월 500 ~ 599 만원
- 월 600 ~ 699 만원
- 월 700 만원 이상
- 잘 모르겠음

귀하는 TV, 라디오, 신문, 또는 인터넷에서 정치에 관한 뉴스에 얼마만큼의 관심을 기울이십니까?

- 관심이 많다
- 관심이 있는 편이다
- 보통인 편이다
- 별로 관심이 없다
- 아예 관심이 없다

다음 문장들에 대하여 얼마나 동의하시는지 표시하여 주십시오. (매우 동의한다 - 전혀 동의하지 않는다 5 단계)

- A. 나는 한국인인 것이 매우 자랑스롭다
- B. 나는 다른 나라의 시민이 되기 보다는 한국 시민이 되고 싶다
- C. 한국은 세계에서 가장 대단한 나라이다
- D. 나는 한국의 역사와 문화가 자랑스롭다
- E. 한국은 비록 다른 나라들과 갈등을 빚게 되더라도 자국의 이익을 먼저 챙겨야 한다